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ARTICLES
HUMAN CLONING AND THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE
Elizabeth Price Foley*
INTRODUCTION
Since the birth of "Dolly the sheep" in July 1996,1 cloning via the
nuclear transfer of differentiated cells2  has been successfully
expanded to numerous and varied animal species,3 including pigs,4
mice,5 goats,6 and cows.7 Applying cloning techniques to humans, it
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University, Detroit College of Law; LL.M., Harvard
Law School; J.D., summa cum laude, University of Tennessee; B.A., Emory University. I
would like to thank my Research Assistant, Greg Gulick, for his aid in researching this
article.
' See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION (1997) [hereinafter NBAC REPORT].
2 Differentiated cells are cells that have differentiated themselves into performing a
specialized function in the body (e.g., liver or muscle cells). See id. app. at 1.
Undifferentiated cells (i.e., totipotent cells) are those cells present in an embryo that have not
yet undergone the process of differentiation. Id. at app. 3. The cloning of undifferentiated
cells, often referred to as "embryo splitting," has been performed on human embryos since
1993. See Rebecca Kolberg, Human Embryo Cloning Reported, 262 SCIENCE 652, 652, (1993);
Susan Katz Miller & Gail Vines, Human Clones Split Fertility Experts, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct.
30, 1993, at 7.
' The widely reported cloning of rhesus monkeys by researchers at the Oregon Health
Sciences University was the result of cloning using embryonic cells, not adult differentiated
cells. See Biotechnology and the Ethics of Cloning: How Far Should We Go?: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Tech., House Comm. on Sci., 105th Cong., 21-22 (1997) (statement of M.
Susan Smith, Ph.D., Director, Oregon Regional Primate Research Center, Oregon Health
Sciences University). Cloning undifferentiated embryonic cells (i.e., embryo splitting) does
not pose the same ethical dilemmas as cloning using adult differentiated cells because when
one clones undifferentiated embryonic cells, one does not know what one is "getting" since the
DNA donor is, by definition, an embryo, and thus his/her traits (e.g., intelligence, height, hair
color, etc.) are not yet known. See Elizabeth Price Foley, The Constitutional Implications of
Human Cloning, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 653 (2000).
' See Gina Kolata, Company Says It Cloned Pig in Effort to Aid Transplants, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2000, at A21 (reporting that the Scottish company, PPL Therapeutics, had created
five piglets using cloning techniques).
See Researchers Clone Mouse from Male Adult Body Cells, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1999, at
F2 (announcing that University of Hawaii scientists had successfully cloned a male mouse
using cells taken from the donor mouse's tail).
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seems, is only a matter of time.8 Indeed, in late November 2001,
researchers at Massachusetts-based Advanced Cell Technology
announced that they had used somatic cell nuclear transfer to
create three human embryos. 9  Specifically, the researchers
harvested human eggs from seven volunteers, removed the nucleus
from each egg, and re-nucleated the eggs with cells taken from an
adult human donor.' ° In all, nineteen human eggs were successfully
re-nucleated using the nuclear transfer technique." Eleven of the
nineteen eggs were re-nucleated with cells taken from the skin of a
human donor the other eight eggs were re-nucleated with cumulus
cells taken from a human donor. 2 None of the eggs that were
re-nucleated with the skin cells were able to begin the process of cell
division, but three of the eight eggs that were re-nucleated with
cumulus cells did begin dividing, with one surviving to the two-cell
stage, one surviving to the four-cell stage, and the third surviving to
the six-cell stage before dying. 3 Although some in the scientific
community have downplayed the significance of these experiments
because the embryos did not survive to the blastocyst stage, 4 it is
clear that the use of nuclear transfer cloning techniques on humans
has begun.
6 See Ron Nissimov, A&M is Hog-Wild over Cloned Animals, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 6, 2001,
at A26, 2001 WL 23626415 (noting that Texas A&M University was the first academic
institution to clone three different animal species).
7 See Gina Kolata, Japanese Scientists Clone a Cow, Making Eight Copies, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 1998, at A8 (reporting that Japanese researchers at Kinki University had created
eight calves by cloning cumulus and fallopian tube cells obtained from the remains of
slaughterhouse cattle); see also Alice Dembner, Cows Cloned by Worcester Firm Reported to be
Growing Normally, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 23, 2001, at A2, 2001 WL 3963462 (disclosing that
two dozen cloned cows continue to live, grow, and behave remarkably similar to their
"noncloned" relatives).
' See Nancy Gibbs, Baby, It's You!And You, And You.. ., TIME, Feb. 19, 2001, at 48 ('The
consensus among biotechnology specialists is that within a few years-some scientists believe
a few months-the news will break of the birth of the first human clone.").
' See Jose B. Cibelli et al., Rapid Communication: Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer in
Humans: Pronuclear and Early Embryonic Development, 2 E-BIOMED: J. REGENERATIVE
MED. 25, 25 (Nov. 26, 2001), http://www.liebertpub.com/ebi/defaultl.asp (last visited January
31, 2002) [hereinafter E-BIOMED]; see also Gina Kolata with Andrew Pollack, A Breakthrough
on Cloning? Perhaps, or Perhaps Not Yet, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at Al.
10 E-BIOMED, supra note 9, at 27-28.
Id. at 28.
2 Id. at 28 tbl. 3.
'3 Id. at 29.
14 Blastocyst is the term used to refer to a preimplantation embryo beginning at
approximately the fourth day after conception, the hallmark of which is the separation of an
inner cell mass (which later becomes the fetus) from an outer mass of support cells. See
NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, app. at 1. It is currently believed that stem cells with the
potential for therapeutic purposes cannot be harvested successfully until the developing
embryo reaches the blastocyst stage. See Monkey Eggs Grow Into Embryos in Experiment,
WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2001, at A07, 2001 WL 30329925.
[Vol. 65
2002] Human Cloning and the Right to Reproduce
Recognizing the inevitability of successful human cloning,
numerous states' 5 and countries' 6 have enacted prophylactic bans
on the technique. The United States Congress, although threat-
ening on numerous occasions to enact a federal ban,'7 has not yet
followed suit. Laws prohibiting cloning that have been enacted thus
far by the states have raised an important legal question: namely,
whether the constitutional right to reproduce protects an
individual's right to produce a child using cloning techniques and, if
so, under what circumstances may this right be exercised?
I. Is THERE A POSITIVE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE?
In order to assess whether or to what extent reproductive human
cloning is constitutionally protected, one must first delineate the
contours of the constitutional right to reproduce. The United States
Supreme Court has clearly indicated that humans have the right
not to reproduce, as evidenced by contraceptive cases such as
Griswold v. Connecticut'" and abortion cases such as Roe v. Wade' 9
and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.2"
Whether the Constitution also provides an affirmative, or positive,
right to reproduce is less clear because the government has rarely
acted to prevent individuals from procreating; hence, there has not
been much litigation directly on point. Nonetheless, the vast
" As of the date this article was written, five states-California, Louisiana, Michigan,
Rhode Island, and Virginia-had enacted statutory bans on human cloning. See CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 24185 (West Supp. 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.36.2 (West 2001);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.430a (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-16.4-2 (reenactment 2001); VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.22 (Michie Supp. 2001).
6 See Foley, supra note 3, at 649 (noting that four states and twenty European nations
have enacted cloning bans). In early December 2001, the United Kingdom became the most
recent nation to ban human cloning, although the law would only ban the implantation into a
human womb of a human embryo created by cloning. See Human Reproductive Cloning Act,
2001, c. 23 (Eng.), http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010023.htm (Dec. 4, 2001) ("A
person who places in a woman a human embryo which has been created otherwise than by
fertilisation is guilty of an offence."). The new British law thus bans only reproductive, as
opposed to therapeutic, cloning. The penalty for violating the law is "imprisonment for a term
not exceeding 10 years or a fine or both." Id. § 1(2).
'7 On July 31, 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill that would ban both
therapeutic and reproductive human cloning. Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R.
2505, 107th Cong. (2001). The U.S. Senate has yet to enact a companion bill. See Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Cloning Executive Presses Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001, at A26.
8 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (declaring the right to use contraceptives to be protected under the
penumbra of the right to privacy).
'9 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (concluding that, although subject to regulation, the right to
privacy encompasses the abortion decision).
20 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (determining that "[b]efore viability, the State's interests are
not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion").
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majority of academic writing in this area acknowledges that a
positive right to reproduce may be implied from extant case law.
One of the earliest cases from which a positive right of
reproduction may be inferred is the Supreme Court's 1923 decision
in Meyer v. Nebraska.2' In Meyer, the Court invalidated a Nebraska
law prohibiting the teaching of any language other than English to
children prior to the eighth grade, stating in dicta, "[w]ithout doubt,
[the liberty interest of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual... to marry, establish a home and
bring up -children.'22  An affirmative right to reproduce was more
specifically addressed by the Court's 1942 decision in Skinner v.
Oklahoma,23 which struck down an Oklahoma statute mandating
sterilization for repeat felons convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude.24 In invalidating the law, the Court invoked strict
scrutiny25 and concluded that, because "[m]arriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the [human]
race,"26 the mandatory sterilization law violated "one of the basic
civil rights of man. '27  Thus, Skinner not only suggests that a
positive right of procreation exists, but also that it is a fundamental
right entitled to the highest level of judicial scrutiny (i.e., strict
scrutiny).
28
This interpretation of Skinner appears to have been confirmed by
the Court's 1972 decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird.9 In Eisenstadt,
the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute that criminalized the
dispensing of contraceptives to single persons who wished to use
them for the prevention of pregnancy. ° The statute violated equal
protection because the law was not rationally related to the
2 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
22 Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
23 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
24 Id. at 536, 543. It should be noted that the Court struck down the Oklahoma statute on
Equal Protection grounds because it forced sterilization only upon a class of habitual felons
convicted of moral turpitude crimes, leaving other habitual felons untouched. Id. at 541-43.
25 Id. at 541.
26 id.
27 Id.
28 Under strict scrutiny, a law infringing on the exercise of the asserted constitutional
right will be invalidated by the court unless the government can prove that the law in
question furthers a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to further that
interest. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
29 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
30 Id. at 441-42, 454-55. As the Court noted, the statute in question had been interpreted
by the Massachusetts court to allow distribution of contraceptives to married persons for use
in the prevention of pregnancy, and also to married or single persons for use in the prevention
of disease. Id. at 441-42.
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purposes it was supposedly designed to serve-namely, deterring
fornication and protecting public health.3' Although Eisenstadt is
an equal protection-rather than a substantive due process case-it
is nevertheless instructive in determining the contours of the right
to reproduce because the Court made it clear that, pursuant to
Griswold, reproductive rights "must be the same for the unmarried
and the married alike' 32 and that, "[i]f the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child."33
Although a good deal of early case law in this area suggested that
the emerging right to reproduce was grounded in the penumbral
right to privacy,3 4 more recent Court pronouncements suggest that
the right is grounded instead in the liberty interest of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. In Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,35 for example,
the Supreme Court stated:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing .... These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right
to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
were they formed under compulsion of the State.36
More recently, in its 1997 decision Washington v. Glucksberg,37
the Court rejected an argument that the liberty interest of the Due
Process Clause includes the right to receive a physician's assistance
with suicide, but acknowledged that "[iun a long line of cases, we
have held that ... the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due
31 Id. at 447-52.
32 Id. at 453.
13 Id. (emphasis added).
34 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
3' 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (holding that the right to abortion exists until the point of fetal
viability).
36 Id. at 851 (emphasis added).
3' 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
2002]
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Process Clause includes the right to marry; to have children; to
direct the education and upbringing of one's children; to marital
privacy; to use contraception; to bodily integrity; and to abortion."38
At a minimum, Skinner and its progeny thus appear to establish
a positive right to reproduce via old-fashioned sexual intercourse.39
Whether this positive right, however, also extends to non-coital
forms of procreation-including widely used technologies such as in
vitro fertilization (IVF)4° and artificial insemination 4 '-is a matter
of conjecture to which one can only make an educated guess.
II. DOES THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE EXTEND TO NON-COITAL
REPRODUCTION?
As mentioned earlier, there is a paucity of case law on the
question of the extension of reproduction rights to non-coital forms
of reproduction because, prior to the enactment of bans on human
cloning, neither the states nor the federal government had
attempted to ban antecedent types of non-coital reproduction. In
vitro fertilization and artificial insemination, for example, have not
been banned in the U.S., despite initially widespread and vociferous
objections to their use.42
The federal government has, however, enacted laws regulating
certain limited aspects of non-coital reproduction. For example, the
31 Id. at 720 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
3' An interesting question exists as to whether this positive right to procreate extends only
to married individuals. The Court's dicta suggests that the right would extend to either
married or single individuals. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child."). Most courts seem to agree, however, that the
right would not extend to adulterous liaisons. See Foley, supra note 3, at 690 n.279
(surveying case law that suggests that the right to reproduce does not extend to adulterous
situations).
' It has been estimated that greater than 150,000 children have been born worldwide as a
result of the use of in vitro fertilization (IVF), and this figure is estimated to reach over
500,000 by the year 2005. LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: CLONING & BEYOND IN A BRAVE
NEW WORLD 69 (1997).
"' It is estimated that approximately 30,000 children are born each year from the use of
artificial insemination by donor (AID). Jenna H. Bauman, Note, Discovering Donors: Legal
Rights to Access Information About Anonymous Sperm Donors Given to Children of Artificial
Insemination in Johnson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 31 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 193, 196 (2001). This figure does not include the use of artificial insemination by
husband (AIH), which is used when the husband's sperm is insufficient to impregnate his
wife through intercourse. See Foley, supra note 3, at 651 n.27 (citing MARGOT JOAN FROMER,
ETHICAL ISSUES IN SEXUALITY AND REPRODUCTION 263 (1983)).
42 See Foley, supra note 3, at 696-700 (surveying initial objections to artificial insemination
and in vitro fertilization and their gradual progress to cultural acceptance).
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Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 199241
mandates those facilities performing IVF,
44 GIFT,45 and ZIFT46
report their annual live birth rates (the so-called "take home baby"
rate) to the federal government, which then publishes this material
and makes it available to consumers.47
Recently, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
taken steps to regulate fertility clinics and cloning research. In
January 2001, the FDA issued a final regulation, which requires
establishments that use human cells, tissues, and cellular and
tissue-based products (HCT/Ps) to register their facilities and list
their products with the FDA.48  Notably, the final rule explicitly
includes establishments, such as fertility clinics, that use
reproductive tissues and cells.49  The FDA has also proposed two
additional regulations that will, if finalized, require HCT/P
establishments to abide by rules for donor suitability ° and good
tissue practices.51 The FDA has also expressed its belief that it has
existing statutory authority to regulate human cloning.52 As such,
the FDA's position is that those wishing to conduct human cloning
research in the United States must obtain an investigational new
4' 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to 263a-7 (1994).
' IVF involves the combination of sperm and egg outside the body and the implantation of
the resulting embryo into the uterus. See Foley, supra note 3, at 656 n.52. IVF is a
treatment used primarily to treat infertility caused by damaged, absent, or blocked fallopian
tubes. See Kelly L. Frey, Comment, New Reproductive Technologies: The Legal Problem and
a Solution, 49 TENN. L. REV. 303, 310-12 (1982). GIFT and ZIFT, on the other hand, are
used when the woman has healthy fallopian tubes-as both of these procedures involve the
implantation of a fertilized or unfertilized egg directly into the fallopian tubes. See infra
notes 45 and 46.
4' GIFT refers to gamete intrafallopian transfer, a process whereby egg and sperm are
combined outside the body and transferred back into a woman's fallopian tubes-
unfertilized-in the hope that the actual process of fertilization will occur inside the fallopian
tubes rather than the petri dish. See Foley, supra note 3, at 656 n.53.
' ZIFT refers to zygote intrafallopian transfer, a process whereby the egg and sperm are
combined, and fertilization occurs, outside the body. See Foley, supra note 3, at 656 n.54.
The zygote is then placed inside the woman's fallopian tubes. Id.
" The information is compiled and published by the Centers for Disease Control and is
available on their website. See http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drh/art98/index.htm (last
reviewed Aug. 14, 2001).
"' See Food and Drugs, 21 C.F.R. pts. 207, 807, 1271 (2001).
49 21 C.F.R. §§ 207.20, 807.20. The purported purpose behind the FDA's new regulatory
framework is to prevent the spread of communicable disease. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.1.
" Suitability Determination for Donors of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 64
Fed. Reg. 52,696 (proposed Sept. 30, 1999) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 210, 211, 820 and
1271).
5' Current Good Tissue Practice for Manufacturers of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based
Products; Inspection and Enforcement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1508 (proposed Jan. 8, 2001) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1271).
52 See Elizabeth C. Price, Does the FDA Have Authority to Regulate Human Cloning?, 11
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 619, 619-20 (1998).
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drug (IND) application approval from the FDA prior to conducting
such research-approval, which the FDA has indicated, will not be
forthcoming due to "major unresolved safety questions."53  Many
food and drug law scholars, however, disagree with the FDA's
interpretation of its statutory authority in this area. 4
Even assuming for the moment that the constitutional right to
reproduce includes the right to use assisted reproductive techniques
in certain situations, governmental regulations of the sort just
mentioned would appear to satisfy even the most rigorous level of
judicial scrutiny. Who would doubt, for example, that the FDA's
HCT/P regulations, which are based upon the Agency's authority to
prevent the spread of communicable diseases,55 would satisfy strict
scrutiny's requirement that the law in question furthers a
compelling governmental interest? There may be some question
around the margins as to whether a given set of regulations is
sufficiently narrowly tailored, but even assuming that this is the
case, it would merely require the government to redraft the
regulations in a more narrow fashion, not scrap to them wholesale. 6
Regulation of assisted reproduction is thus clearly possible within
certain parameters. But what of banning such practices? What if,
for example, a state or the federal government decided to completely
ban the use of certain non-coital reproduction methods such as IVF?
Would such a sweeping ban be constitutional?
Extant case law-although admittedly limited-appears to
suggest a negative answer to this question. One of the most recent
and closely analogous cases, Gerber v. Hickman,57 involved a Section
1983 action by a state prisoner who claimed that his substantive
due process rights-specifically, his right to reproduce-was
" Letter from Kathryn C. Zoon, Ph.D., Director, FDA Center for Biologics Evaluation and
Research, to various researchers (Mar. 28, 2001), at http://www.fda.gov/cber/ltr/aaclone.htm.
' See generally, Price, supra note 52; Gregory J. Rokosz, Human Cloning: Is the Reach of
FDA Authority Too Far a Stretch?, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 464, 512-15 (2000) (suggesting
that the FDA has overstepped the bounds of its legal authority); Rick Weiss, Legal Barriers to
Human Cloning May Not Hold Up, WASH. POST, May 23, 2001, at Al, 2001 WL 17630199;
Caroline Daniel, Conflicting Aims Leave Ban on Human Cloning in Limbo, WASH. POST, July
26, 1998, at A8, 1998 WL 11594186 (reporting the concern expressed by some authorities that
the FDA is unequipped to deal with the widespread ethical and social issues involved with
cloning).
'" See 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (1994) ("The Surgeon General, with the approval of the Secretary,
is authorized to make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to
prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases ... ").
36 See Foley, supra note 3, at 714-15, 719, 725-26, 729-30 (urging that a more narrowly
tailored means of regulating human cloning, short of a complete ban, exist).
7 264 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2001), reh'g granted, 273 F.3d 843 (2001). As indicated by the
citation just provided, the Ninth Circuit has agreed to reconsider the Gerber decision en banc.
As of this writing, the en banc decision had not yet been rendered.
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violated by the prison's refusal to allow him to mail a semen
specimen to a laboratory for use in artificially inseminating his
wife.58 The federal district court initially granted a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion in favor of the prison, ruling that "[w]hatever right plaintiff
has to artificial insemination, it does not survive incarceration."5 9 A
divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed, explicitly acknowledging that
a positive right to reproduce exists60 and that this right survives
incarceration.6 The court further concluded that the reproductive
rights of prisoners could be restricted for "legitimate penological
reasons."62 Based on the relatively bare record before it, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the prison's articulated penological reasons
for restricting the prisoner's reproductive freedom were insufficient
to warrant a 12(b)(6) dismissal of the prisoner's Section 1983
substantive due process claim and remanded the case back to
district court for further proceedings.63
The Gerber decision is remarkable for several reasons. First, the
court (including the dissenting judge) seems to assume that there is
a fundamental, positive right to reproduce. Second, the judges all
seem to imply that this right would, at least outside the prison
context, include the right of an individual to access and use
non-coital means of reproduction such as artificial insemination.
The majority, for example, goes out of its way to make clear that the
prisoner's right that has been infringed is the general right to
procreate, and that the salient question, therefore, is whether the
action by the prison-refusing to allow access to artificial
insemination-is being restricted for legitimate penological
reasons."4 The court refuses to frame the question presented as
58 Id. at 884-85.
9 Gerber v. Hickman, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
0 Gerber, 264 F.3d at 887.
61 Id. at 890.
62 Id. at 890; see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 (1990). The Harper Court
made it clear that this "legitimate penological interests" standard is the appropriate standard
to employ in assessing the constitutionality of prison regulations, even if the constitutional
right infringed by the regulation is a fundamental one. Id. at 223.
63 Gerber, 264 F.3d at 892-93.
' See, e.g., id. at 886 n.3
The district court concludes in part that a prisoner does not have a fundamental right to
artificial insemination. The district court erred in its framing of the fundamental right
involved in this case. The question of whether a prisoner retains a fundamental right to
procreate while in prison is a different question than whether a constitutional right to
artificial insemination exists and survives incarceration.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
As we make clear, the general fundamental right to procreate, well-recognized by the
federal courts, is the right we hold to survive incarceration, not a more narrow
manifestation of that right involving a particular means of procreation. The narrower
20021
Albany Law Review
whether a prisoner has a right to artificial insemination, 65 instead
preferring to start with the assumption that any individual-
prisoner or not-has a fundamental right to reproduce, and then
assessing whether the prison's policy barring access to artificial
insemination can be characterized as furthering legitimate
penological purposes. In this manner, the court assumes that, since
artificial insemination provides a means to reproduce, it falls within
the ambit of a larger, fundamental right to reproduce. Thus, the
court suggests that disallowing conjugal visits may not violate a
prisoner's right to reproduce because the restriction may, in some
instances, serve a legitimate penological purpose (presumably,
safety and security). On the other hand, a policy restricting
alternative forms of reproduction that do not require physical
contact with the prisoner (such as artificial insemination) may well
violate the prisoner's right to reproduce.66
The dissenting judge in Gerber likewise implies that, outside the
prison context, the right to reproduce could encompass a right to
access assisted reproductive technology such as artificial
insemination. Unlike the majority, however, he frames the issue in
the case as whether "inmates retain a constitutional right to
procreate from prison via FedEx.'67 While he acknowledges that
prisoners have a "right to maintain their procreative abilities for
later use once released from custody, ' 68 he concludes that, while in
prison, this right to reproduce does not exist at all because it is
'fundamentally incompatible with imprisonment itself.'
69
Another illuminating case is Lifchez v. Hartigan,7 ° rendered by
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
issue is one that can be answered only after a record is developed and an examination
can be conducted of the penological reasons, if any, for prohibiting the particular conduct
at issue.
Id.
65 Id. at 888 n.6.
66 See id. at 890.
Procreation that results from the employment of recently developed methods or
techniques that bypass physical contact with the prisoner's spouse is not inherently
inconsistent with one's status as a prisoner. In fact, even conjugal visits and childbirth
are not inherently inconsistent with such status, as the experience in California's prisons
demonstrates.
Id.
67 Id. at 893 (Silverman, J., dissenting).
61 Id. (emphasis omitted).
69 Id. at 894. This case repeated the standard set forth in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517
(1984), that "prisoners be accorded those rights not fundamentally inconsistent with
imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of incarceration. Id. at 523.
70 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff'd without opinion, sub nom. Lifchez v. Hartigan,
914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Scholberg v. Lifchez, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991).
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in 1990. In Lifchez, a physician brought a class action on behalf of
all physicians specializing in reproductive endocrinology and
fertility counseling, seeking to have the Illinois fetal
anti-experimentation statute declared unconstitutional.7  Dr.
Lifchez asserted that the statute was a violation of a woman's right
to privacy and reproductive freedom, as well as unconstitutionally
vague.72 The statute in question stated:
No person shall sell or experiment upon a fetus produced by
the fertilization of a human ovum by a human sperm unless
such experimentation is therapeutic to the fetus thereby
produced. Intentional violation of this section is a Class A
misdemeanor. Nothing in this subsection (7) is intended to
prohibit the performance of in vitro fertilization.73
The court first determined that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague for failing to adequately define the terms
"experiment," "experimentation," and "therapeutic. 74 After reading
the statute, the court concluded that a physician could not be sure
whether certain assisted reproductive technologies and procedures
were prohibited.75  Specifically, although the statute explicitly
exempted in vitro fertilization, the court agreed with Dr. Lifchez
that it was not clear whether the statute prohibited related
non-coital reproduction techniques, such as the use of IVF followed
by embryo transfer.76 Furthermore, the court found that the statute
might prohibit IVF-related techniques such as genetic screening of
the in vitro embryos77 the hormonal induction of ovulation7" and
"' Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1363.
72 Id.
" Id. at 1363-64 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 38 para. 81-26, § 6(7) (1989)).
71 Id. at 1364-72.
71 Id. at 1370.
76 Id. at 1367-68. The court described embryo transfer as the "removal of an embryo from
one woman's uterus and placing it in the uterus of a second woman." Id. at 1367. Although
this basic description would encompass both coital and non-coital reproduction, the court
went on to specifically address the non-coital use of embryo transfer. Id. at 1367 ("The
variations on this basic technique are considerable. A donated egg could be fertilized in vitro
(with a partner's or a donor's sperm), be placed in a second woman's uterus to gestate for five
days, and then be flushed out for implantation in the woman trying to get pregnant.").
" Id. at 1368 ("If the genetic screening on the single cell is negative, the remaining seven
cells can be gestated to produce a child. This experimental procedure is undisputedly non-
therapeutic to the embryo, and although it could fall within the statute's in vitro exception,
that exception speaks to fertilization, not genetic testing.") (internal citation omitted).
" Id. at 1368-69
In order to improve the chances of super-ovulation resulting in a pregnancy, Dr. Lifchez
may need to experiment with particular elements in the procedure to achieve a more
receptive uterine lining or better quality embryos. Not all such attempts will be




changes to the manner by which the in vitro fertilization occurs.
79
Because the legislative history behind the statute's passage
indicated that the bill's sponsor may well have intended the IVF
exception language to allow IVF only "as it is presently performed""°
and disallow future research or alteration of IVF techniques,8 the
court concluded that the act "impermissibly restricts a woman's
fundamental right of privacy, in particular, her right to make
reproductive choices free of governmental interference with those
choices. 82  Citing cases such as Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and
Population Services International,83 the court determined that
[e]mbryo transfer is a procedure designed to enable an
infertile woman to bear her own child. It takes no great leap
of logic to see that within the cluster of constitutionally
protected choices that includes the right to have access to
contraceptives, there must be included within that cluster
the right to submit to a medical procedure that may bring
about, rather than prevent, pregnancy.84
The Lifchez decision thus indicates that lower courts may view
the landmark Supreme Court decisions protecting such things as an
individual's right to use contraceptives, 85 to obtain pre-viability
abortions,86 and to be free from forced sterilization87 as part of a
larger constitutional right to "reproductive autonomy" which is,
perhaps, best defined as a right to "be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.'"8
Id. (internal citation omitted).
79 See id. at 1369 (mentioning possible changes in the "shape of the vessel in which in vitro
fertilization occurs, and the growth media in which the ova are fertilized").
80 Id. at 1369.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1376.
83 Id.
' Id. at 1377 (emphasis added).
85 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (declaring a law, which forbade
the use of contraceptives, as violative of the fundamental right to privacy); Carey v.
Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 690-91 (1977) (holding that a law limiting the
distribution of contraceptives only by licensed pharmacists unconstitutional because the state
interests did not justify such an intrusion on fundamental protected rights).
86 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)
(concluding that a woman's right to an abortion is derived from the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
87 See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
88 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis added). See also supra notes
29-33 and accompanying text.
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Another case worth noting is the famous Baby M case decided by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1988.89 In this case, William
Stern entered into a surrogacy contract with Mary Beth
Whitehead,9" whereby Stern would provide semen with which
Whitehead would be artificially inseminated. 9' Pursuant to the
terms of the contract, any resulting child would be delivered to the
custody of Stern, and Whitehead covenanted to take all necessary
legal steps to terminate her maternal rights to the child.92 After the
baby was born, Whitehead refused to relinquish custody and Stern
sued to enforce the terms of the surrogacy contract.93
Stern and Whitehead both asserted that their state and federal
constitutional rights would be violated if they were not granted
custody of Baby M-Stern basing his argument on the right to
reproduce, Whitehead on the right to companionship of her child.94
Citing numerous decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, the New
Jersey Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that both of these
asserted rights existed and were fundamental.95 With regard to
Stern's asserted right to reproduce, the court delineated its contours
as "the right to have natural children, whether through sexual
intercourse or artificial insemination."96  In so stating, the New
Jersey Supreme Court clearly accepted the notion that the
fundamental right to reproduce includes the right to use ARTs such
as artificial insemination. Indeed, because the court defined the
right as "the right to have natural children,"97 this arguably
includes the right to use other, non-sexual ARTs such as cloning.
After having accepted and defined the right to reproduce, the court
concluded that, because Baby M indeed had been born, Stern had
not been deprived of this fundamental right.98
89 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
9o Id. at 1235. Mrs. Stern was not a party to the contract, but Mr. Whitehead was. Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. Mr. Whitehead also covenanted to take all legal steps necessary to rebut the
presumption of paternity that attached to the husband of a pregnant woman under New
Jersey law. Id.
9' Id. at 1237.
9' Id. at 1253.
9' Id. ("Whatever their source, it is clear that [these asserted rights] are fundamental
rights protected by both the federal and state Constitutions.").
9 Id.
97 Id.




III. DOES THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE EXTEND TO ASEXUAL
REPRODUCTION?
Even assuming the Supreme Court would accept that the
Constitution protects, at least to some extent, the right to reproduce
by non-coital, sexual methods, such as artificial insemination or
IVF, the question remains as to whether it would agree that the
right of reproduction extends even further to include the use of
non-coital, asexual methods.
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that, as recent research
has indicated, asexual reproduction is not limited to cloning.
Parthenogenesis, or "virgin birth," is a process whereby eggs
spontaneously begin the process of cell division without the need for
sperm.99 Parthenogenesis thus differs from nuclear transfer cloning
because it does not require the re-nucleation of a donor egg using
the differentiated cell of a donor."' All it takes, in other words, is
an egg and the right environment. In a situation not involving
natural parthenogenesis, this likely means that the egg must be
soaked in a combination of chemicals. If the mix of chemicals is
right, the egg will begin spontaneously dividing as though
fertilization had occurred.
Parthenogenesis occurs naturally in numerous animal species,
including some mammals.0 1 And in late November 2001, the
scientists at Advanced Cell Technology revealed that they had
successfully induced parthenogenesis in human eggs stimulated by
chemicals.0 2 Specifically, the study involved the use of twenty-two
donor eggs from three volunteers that were incubated in certain
substances, rinsed, and placed in a culture media.0 3 After twelve
hours, twenty of the twenty-two eggs (ninety percent) had begun the
9 See LAURENCE E. KARP, M.D., GENETIC ENGINEERING: THREAT OR PROMISE? 185 (1976).
'0 See id. at 185 (explaining that parthenogenesis does not require fertilization); see also E-
BIOMED, supra note 9, at 28 (detailing the requirements of nuclear transfer cloning as
involving eggs fertilized with sperm).
... The species are varied, including drone bees, poultry, mice, golden hamsters, KARP,
supra note 99, at 188-90, aphids, turkeys and some reptiles. See Rick Weiss, 'Parthenotes"
Expand the Debate on Stein Cells, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2001, at All, 2001 WL 31541438
[hereinafter Parthenotes]. It is also used by some to explain the phenomenon of Jesus' birth
to the Virgin Mary. See Judith F. Daar, The Future of Human Cloning: Prescient Lessons
From Medical Ethics Past, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 167, 169 n.ll (1998).
102 See E-BIOMED, supra note 9, at 25, 27-28; see also Parthenotes, supra note 101
(explaining that the "human eggs ... gr[e]w into embryo-like balls of about [one hundred]
cells").
103 E-BIOMED, supra note 9, at 27.
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process of cell division; after five days, six of the original twenty-two
(thirty percent) had divided to the point of forming blastomeres.
0 4
Whether by parthenogenesis or cloning, some scholars adamantly
insist that asexual reproduction is qualitatively different from
reproduction by sexual means (including sexual ARTs such as IVF),
and thus should be afforded little or no constitutional protection. 10 5
The gist of this objection is that cloning, and presumably,
parthenogenesis precisely because it is asexual, should be treated
differently, even though the result is the same as with sexual
reproduction-namely, the creation of a human being. " 6 Opponents
of cloning thus assert that, although the ends are the same as that
of sexual reproduction, the means are different, and the law should
focus on the means, not the ends.
The difficulty with this objection is its vagueness. What is the
difference between sexual and asexual reproduction? The only
objectively apparent difference is that sexual reproduction requires
the union of sperm and egg (whether in the bedroom or petri dish),
whereas asexual reproduction does not.10 7 The other differences
discussed thus far in the debate are merely speculative and based
more on one's theological or ideological preferences than on any
objective data.0 8 These include fears about the impact of asexual
reproduction on the institutions of marriage and the family,
personal autonomy and privacy, the sanctity of life, the health and
safety of the developing human embryo, and genetic diversity.'0 9
,4 Id. at 27-28, tbl. 2. For more information on blastomeres, see supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
'05 See Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans on
Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 666 (1998) (comparing present legal
reproductive technologies, which require a mix of genes that create a genotype that has never
existed before, to cloning, which merely replicates a genotype already in existence); George J.
Annas, Human Cloning: A Choice or an Echo?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 247, 254 (1998)
(arguing that cloning is not reproduction at all, but is merely replication, and represents an
entirely different method in which humans can reproduce); Andre P. Rose, Note, Reproductive
Misconception: Why Cloning Is Not Just Another Assisted Reproductive Technology, 48 DUKE
L.J. 1133, 1150 (1999) (analogizing cloning with manufacturing, since the only objective is the
replication of that which already exists).
'0' No legitimate scholar has suggested, to this author's knowledge, that the offspring of
human cloning would not be fully human, science fiction scenarios notwithstanding. See
Foley, supra note 3, at 658-77 (discussing the personhood of the offspring of human cloning,
and the statutory and constitutional protections flowing therefrom).
"' See Foley, supra note 3, at 700 (reporting that while other ARTs require the unification
of sperm and egg, cloning does not).
'08 For a general discussion of these speculative fears about asexual reproduction, see




Many of these fears were also vehemently voiced as the basis for
opposing the use of sexual ARTs such as IVF and artificial
insemination.110 Not surprisingly, these fears have significantly
subsided as time has gone by, to the point where an overwhelming
majority of Americans supports the use of sexual ARTs.'"
Moreover, it seems axiomatic that fear should not provide a
sufficient basis for legal prohibition of action. As Justice Brandeis
eloquently put it in the context of the First Amendment, "[flear of
serious injury cannot alone justify suppression .... [Because of
fear] [m]en feared witches and burnt women."'
' 12
Because these speculative fears about asexual reproduction are
ineluctably rooted in one's subjective experience and beliefs (i.e.,
ethics and morality), many find it difficult, if not impossible, to
move beyond them. I do not mean to suggest that there is no room
for ethical considerations in the development of public policy and
law-quite the contrary. I do mean to suggest however, that,
absent objective evidence that damage to persons or valued
institutions will occur, judges and lawmakers should resist the
temptation to base public policy on such considerations. If
majoritarian fears of harm-without evidence that such harms will
indeed occur-can provide a valid basis for governmental
prohibition of conduct, many of the liberties we now enjoy would
undoubtedly be short-lived. If one puts aside, at least for the
moment, these speculative fears about asexual reproduction, one is
left with considering whether asexual reproduction-merely
because it does not require union of sperm and egg-should be
treated differently under the law.
As I have argued strenuously in the past"3 the asexual nature of
cloning (or, for that matter, parthenogenesis), standing alone,
should not be sufficient to justify a ban on the practice. There is
simply no evidence that the asexual nature of this particular means
of reproduction will result in any harms not already presented by
sexual reproduction. Moreover, the end result-the birth of a
child-is undeniably the same, whether reproduction is
accomplished by sexual or asexual means. If the affirmative right
to reproduce means anything, should it not mean that we, as human
..0 See Foley, supra note 3 at 696-99 (cataloging initial objections to AI and IVF).
. Id. at 699-700 (contending that many supporters consider the use of ARTs as a
"fundamental aspect of liberty").
..2 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
13 See generally Elizabeth Price Foley, The Constitutional Implications of Human Cloning,
42 ARIZ. L. REV. 647 (2000).
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beings, have the right to bear or beget biologically related offspring?
If so, what difference should the means employed make? Why
should the law care, in other words, how our children are conceived?
If the law does not care what sexual position we assume when we
conceive our children and does not care whether our children are
conceived in a petri dish, why should it care whether our children
are conceived without the use of sperm? From a feminist pers-
pective, a legal construct that allows reproduction by sexual
intercourse or by the artificial sexual union of sperm and egg (e.g.,
IVF) but not by cloning or parthenogenesis smacks of sexism, or
more precisely, sperm-ism. How could the law justify allowing all
means of reproduction except those requiring the use of sperm? Is
there something magical about sperm that gives lawmakers
comfort, other than the fact that most of them have it? Although
the Founding Fathers certainly never envisioned the possibility of
reproduction without the use of sperm, do we really believe they
intended to deny the right to have a biologically related child simply
because the means employed did not involve its use? Should the
ability of an individual to fulfill the dream of raising and loving his
or her own child hinge upon the presence or absence of this one
substance? I think it clear that it is the ends that matter, not the
means. So long as the object is to have a child of one's own, the
means employed should be legally irrelevant.
Although my own conclusions with regard to this issue are rather
clear, I am left wondering (as is any academic writing about an
issue of first impression) whether a court would concur. In other
words, what would be the likely reaction of a court to this question?
If asked, would a court sanction the use of asexual reproduction as
constitutionally protected activity? Answering these questions
requires a different construct, for these questions are not normative
ones (i.e., what should a court do?), but pragmatic ones (i.e., what
will a court likely do?). This, in turn, requires something more than
acknowledgment and assessment of legal doctrine. It requires
acknowledgment and assessment of the inevitable human tendency
towards outcome-orientation (i.e., what is the conclusion I wish to
reach and how do I then justify it?).
With this in mind, we can now turn to the pragmatic question:
What would a court likely do when asked whether the right to
reproduce encompasses the use of asexual methods such as cloning?
A court would undoubtedly start with the substantive due process
analytical legal framework pronounced in Washington v.
20021
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Glucksberg."4 Specifically, the Supreme Court has recognized two
salient features that identify practices protected by substantive due
process: (1) the practice is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition"' and "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such
that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed,""'1 5 and (2) there is a 'careful description"' of the liberty
interest being asserted.'
6
The second feature-the careful description of the interest being
asserted-is necessary, according to the Glucksberg Court, "because
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area
are scarce and open-ended""' 7  and because "[b]y extending
constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we,
to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public
debate and legislative action,"'1 8 thus running the risk that "the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed
into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court."''9 With a
cognizance of the possibility of subjective Lochnerian2 ° judicial
lawmaking thus firmly in mind, the Glucksberg Court went on to
carefully describe the right asserted by the respondents as "a right
to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing
so.""2' The plaintiffs in Glucksberg had, not surprisingly, framed
the issue quite differently. Specifically, they had argued that the
right being asserted was a 'right to die with dignity,""22 to 'choose
a humane, dignified death""23 or to "control[] the manner and
timing of ... death."'
12 4
Once the Glucksberg Court had "carefully described" the right
asserted as a "right to commit suicide," the outcome of the case was
14 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
115 Id. at 721 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
... Id. (citation omitted).
.. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992), quoted in part in
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
1"8 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
"' Id. (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
120 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating, as violative of the substantive
due process right of liberty of contract, a New York statute forbidding employment in a
bakery for more than sixty hours per week or ten hours per day). For more on the Lochner
era of substantive due process analysis and the New Deal Court's rejection of Lochnerian
judicial behavior, see Elizabeth C. Price, Constitutional Fidelity and the Commerce Clause: A
Reply to Professor Ackerman, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 139, 157-67 (1998).
121 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.
122 Id. at 790 (Breyer, J., concurring).
123 Id. at 722.
124 Id. at 742 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 790 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(suggesting that the precise words used are incidental since "personal control" over the
specifics is the paramount significance in each phrase).
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sealed.1 25 Applying the second feature of substantive due process
analysis, the Court concluded that the Nation's history and
traditions did not indicate that there was a "deeply rooted" right to
commit suicide-quite the contrary, since hundreds of years of
Anglo-American law have considered assistance with suicide a
crime. 126
A similar fate could await those who may assert that there is a
constitutional right to have access to or to use cloning,
parthenogenesis, or other asexual reproductive technology. If the
Court determined, as a normative matter, that asexual reproduction
was undesirable, it could reject a substantive due process claim by
"carefully describing" the right being asserted as a "right to engage
in asexual reproduction." So described, there is little doubt that the
second substantive due process inquiry-i.e., whether the asserted
right is "deeply rooted" in our Nation's history and traditions-
would be answered in the negative. Given the recent genesis of
asexual means of human reproduction and the virtually uniform
popular condemnation of such procedures, the use of asexual
reproductive technology is not likely to be characterized by the court
as "deeply rooted" in our nation's history and traditions.
Of course, the newness of a given action is not, ipso facto, the
death knell for its constitutional protection. Even conservative
justices such as Justice Scalia have recognized that activities that
are not "old" enough to qualify as deeply rooted in our history and
traditions may, nonetheless, be found to qualify for constitutional
protection, so long as courts refer "to the most specific level at which
a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the
asserted right can be identified." '127 In other words, in situations
involving new phenomena, one must attempt to analogize as best as
125 Id. at 723-24. A similar statement about the outcome-determinative force of how issues
are framed could be made with regard to the Court's 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986). In that case, the Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of a
Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy. Id. at 188. After framing the issue as "whether the
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and
hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and have
done so for a very long time," id. at 190, the Court concluded that such conduct was not
protected by substantive due process. Id. at 192-96. Given the manner in which the asserted
right was "carefully described" by the Court, the conclusion seemed foregone. The four
dissenters in Bowers, of course, framed the issue very differently. See id. at 199, 203-05
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (characterizing the asserted right as "'the right to be let alone"'-
especially in matters of sexual privacy); id. at 214 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (depicting the
asserted right as the "right to choose for [one's self] how to conduct ... intimate
relationships").
126 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711.
27 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion).
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one can. Thus, the lawyer's job is to identify, as closely as possible,
an analogous tradition that is either protected or not protected.
The constitutional protection afforded to asexual reproduction
thus depends, once again, on how one frames the right being
asserted. Specifically, proponents and opponents of human cloning
must attempt to identify an analogous tradition and argue,
respectively, that it historically has or has not been protected by
law. Which analogy the courts ultimately embrace will thus seal
the outcome of this substantive due process issue. But what are the
possible analogies for which proponents and opponents of human
cloning would argue?
Proponents of human cloning would, of course, argue for the use
of a broad analogue. Specifically, they would argue that the most
closely analogous tradition that can be identified is reproduction. If
a court agreed with this characterization, it would necessarily
conclude that asexual reproduction (such as cloning) is but a subset
of the larger category of reproduction; hence, because reproduction
historically has been protected, so should asexual reproduction.
This approach, however, probably would not satisfy conservative
jurists, such as Justice Scalia, who presumably would emphasize
that the Court's task, in assessing the constitutional protection of a
new activity under substantive due process analysis, is to identify
the most specific-i.e., most narrowly drawn-analogue possible in
order to avoid Lochnerian pitfalls.
Proponents of asexual reproduction could, however, also argue for
a more narrow analogue-specifically, the use of sexual ARTs such
as IVF and artificial insemination. A court wishing to adopt such a
middle ground approach would be required to decide whether and to
what extent sexual ARTs are constitutionally protected. The consti-
tutional protection afforded to human cloning (and parthenogenesis)
would thus be coextensive with that of other ARTs. Since other
ARTs appear to enjoy a high degree of constitutional protection,
128
asexual reproductive methods would be similarly protected.
A court could also conclude that there is no apt analogy to be
drawn between asexual reproduction and sexual reproduction-that
these are, in other words, sui generis, "apples and oranges. In order
to conclude, however, that asexual and sexual reproduction are
apples and oranges, the court would need to catalog the differences
between the two types of reproduction. Given the strong
128 See supra notes 57-98 and accompanying text.
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similarities between cloning and existing sexual ARTs such as IVF,
this would be a difficult task.
The differences between reproduction via sexual intercourse and
reproduction via ARTs (sexual or asexual), on the other hand, are
rather apparent. The former requires a physical intimacy between
a man and woman, the latter does not, at least not in the traditional
sense. Indeed, once one moves away from old-fashioned intercourse
(and perhaps artificial insemination), reproduction is accomplished
in essentially the same way: an ovum is somehow stimulated to
begin the process of cell division. With IVF, the stimulation is
achieved by the addition of sperm. With parthenogenesis, the
stimulation is achieved by chemicals. With cloning, the stimulation
is achieved by a combination of a mild jolt of electricity followed by
cell starvation. Traditional physical intimacy between man and
woman is neither implicated nor threatened.
Given the rather stark difference between sexual intercourse and
all forms of assisted reproduction, and the equally stark similarities
among the various types of artificial reproduction, a court wishing
to say that sexual and asexual reproduction are "apples and
oranges" would thus have a difficult time. A more apt charac-
terization would be that sexual intercourse is the "apple" and all
other artificial reproductive technologies are the "oranges." The
difficulty with this conclusion, of course, is that it leaves all of the
oranges (ARTs) constitutionally unprotected and hence, vulnerable
to complete prohibition. IVF, GIFT, ZIFT, and other ARTs could be
as easily banned as cloning-a result that is, pragmatically
speaking, unacceptable.
An outcome-oriented court preferring not to leave all types of
ARTs vulnerable to legislative attack could, as an alternative,
conclude that all forms of reproduction are constitutionally
protected but vary the degree of constitutional protection according
to the means employed. A court could thus acknowledge a
hierarchy of constitutional protection, similar to the hierarchy
recognized in equal protection jurisprudence. 129  Under this
approach, presumably, reproduction via sexual intercourse would
receive the highest degree of constitutional protection, given its
inherent privacy implications and undoubted characterization as a
right which is deeply rooted in our nation's history and traditions.'30
129 See ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 305-21 (1987) (illustrating
landmark court decisions that established the application of various levels of scrutiny to cases
involving such issues as gender, race, and other forms of discrimination).
30 The Court clearly does not look favorably on legal impediments to intimate heterosexual
2002]
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Laws attempting to infringe upon an individual's ability to engage
in reproduction via sexual intercourse would thus be subjected to
the strictest judicial scrutiny.13" ' Just below this category of judicial
protection would fall laws regulating reproduction by assisted (i.e.,
non-coital) means.1 32 A court opting for this approach would likely
reason that although many ARTs have achieved a broad level of
acceptance and use, they do not enjoy the same historical and
traditional reverence as reproduction via sexual intercourse. 133
Moreover, while there are certain intimacy and privacy interests
implicated by reproduction via ARTs, these interests are somewhat
diminished. When an egg is stimulated to begin division in a petri
dish, whether by sperm, chemicals, or a jolt of electricity, the
specter of "bedroom police" is not as apparent or threatening. For
this reason, under a hierarchical approach, a court could uphold a
law regulating the personnel and facilities employed in IVF cloning
or other ARTs 134-regulations that would not be tolerated for
reproduction via sexual intercourse. Thus, while the government
would be able to restrict the use of ARTs to certain places (e.g.,
licensed facilities) and prohibit the application of ARTs except by
certain personnel (e.g., physicians), it certainly would not be able to
impose the same kinds of restrictions on sexual intercourse.
relations. In invalidating Connecticut's law restricting access to contraceptives, the Court
stated:
Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale
signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political
parties, older than our school system.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
Subsequently, the Court made it clear that the rights pronounced in Griswold extended to
unmarried persons as well. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). The right to
engage in sexual intercourse, however, whether for procreative or non-procreative purposes,
does not currently extend to homosexual relations. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
'3 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (invoking strict scrutiny to
invalidate an Oklahoma law that authorized the mandatory sterilization of certain habitual
felons). Strict scrutiny demands that the law in question "serve a compelling governmental
interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest." Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to federal racial classifications).
32 Under the current equal protection hierarchy, a law subject to intermediate scrutiny
must serve an important governmental objective, and the means employed must be
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. See United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982)) (demanding that an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' be shown to preserve a
government action dealing with gender classifications).
'33 Indeed, as discussed more extensively in Part II, supra, there is very little case law even
addressing the issue of whether the use of ARTs is constitutionally protected.
134 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (explaining the main differences among
several methods of non-coital reproduction).
Human Cloning and the Right to Reproduce
CONCLUSION
It appears quite clear that the Constitution provides individuals
with the fundamental right to reproduce. While Supreme Court
caselaw has only directly addressed the right to reproduce in the
context of sexual intercourse, lower courts have, in a few rare
instances, been asked to consider whether the right extends to the
use of ARTs. The limited number of courts that have considered
this question thus far have unanimously agreed that the right to
reproduce does include the right to use ARTs such as artificial
insemination and IVF. Thus, although it seems reasonable to
assume that the use of ARTs enjoys some degree of constitutional
protection, it is not clear whether laws attempting to regulate ARTs
would be entitled to strict judicial scrutiny.
A more challenging question is posed by the emerging possibility
of the use of asexual ARTs such as cloning or parthenogenesis.
Whether the constitutional right to reproduce extends to asexual
reproduction is a question that can, in the end, only be answered by
engaging in a traditional substantive due process analysis, which
would require a court to identify the most closely analogous
protected or unprotected activity extant. The analogue chosen by
the courts, moreover, will ineluctably hinge upon pragmatic,
outcome-oriented considerations; hence, depending on the analogue
chosen by the courts, asexual reproduction may or may not be
constitutionally protected. Analogizing asexual reproduction to
reproduction in general would allow a court to grant full
constitutional protection to asexual reproduction, as well as sexual
ARTs. On the other hand, a court could assert that asexual
reproduction and sexual reproduction are apples and oranges, and
that there is no currently protected activity analogous to asexual
reproduction. This conclusion would be pragmatically difficult to
justify given the strong similarities between cloning and existing
sexual ARTs such as IVF, and could lead to the conclusion that
reproduction by sexual intercourse enjoys full constitutional
protection whereas non-coital reproduction (including IVF) enjoys
no constitutional protection at all.
Between these two extremes, a court could opt for a middle
ground, reasoning that asexual reproduction is most analogous to
existing sexual ARTs such as IVF. The constitutional protection
afforded to asexual means of reproduction would thus be
coextensive with the constitutional protection afforded to sexual
ARTs. Since the courts that have addressed the constitutional
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protection of sexual ARTs have thus far unanimously concluded
that sexual ARTs do fall within the ambit of the right to reproduce,
this approach would likely extend some degree of constitutional
protection to asexual ARTs such as cloning and parthenogenesis.
Although there are numerous pragmatic considerations that will
drive the decision as to which analogue a court will embrace in a
substantive due process analysis, courts and citizens alike should
not lose sight of the fact that the end result of asexual
reproduction-the birth of a child-is something we should all
welcome and embrace. And although, by definition, asexual
reproduction does not require the use of sperm, the end result is one
that has been witnessed billions of times over millions of years, and
it is this miraculous end-not the means-that the fundamental
right to reproduce should protect.
